Last Updated, August 29, 1999

Idiot Legal Arguments: A Casebook for Dealing with Extremist Legal Arguments

Part Four

By Bernard J. Sussman, JD, MLS, CP

Objections to name printed in block letters (all-caps):   US v. Lindbloom (WD Wash unpub 4/16/97) 79 AFTR2d 2578, 97 USTC para 50650; Braun v. Stotts (D Kan unpub 6/19/97) aff’d (10th Cir unpub 2/4/98); Jaeger v. Dubuque County (ND Iowa 1995) 880 F.Supp 640 at 643 ("The court finds Jaeger’s arguments concerning capitalization otherwise specious.  The court routinely capitalizes the names of all parties before this court in all matters, civil and criminal, without any regard to their corporate or individual status...."; crank's reference to a law dictionary's definition of "capitalize" -- as a financial term -- was completely misdirected); Vos v. Boyle (WD Mich unpub 4/11/95); Liebig v. Kelley-Allee (EDNC 1996) 923 F.Supp 778; Boyce v. CIR (9/25/96) TC Memo 1996-439 aff’d (9th Cir 1997) 122 F3d 1069; Smith v. Kitchen (10th Cir 1997) 156 F3d 1025, 97 USTC para 50107;  US v. J.F. Heard (ND WV 1996) 952 F.Supp 329; J. Napier v. Jonas (WD Mich unpub 2/10/95); Wacker v. Crow (10th Cir unpub 7/1/99); Rosenheck & Co. Inc. v. US ex rel IRS & Kostich (ND Okla unpub 4/9/97) 79 AFTR2d 2715 (court explicitly found that perp was the same person as his name typed in all-caps and without punctuation); ("claims because his name is in all capital letters on the summons, he is not subject to the summons. ... completely without merit, patently frivolous, and will be rejected without expending any more of this court's resources") Russell v.  US (WD Mich 1997) 969 F.Supp 24; US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100 (tried to refuse all pleadings and court papers that spelled his name in all caps and without intervening punctuation); Rippy v.  IRS (ND Calif unpub 1/26/99) ("Plaintiff's response ... consists of nothing more than a protest against the capitalization of his name in the caption.  Accordingly, summary judgment is granted in favor of defendants and against plaintiff."); ditto Hancock v. State of Utah (10th Cir unpub 5/10/99) 176 F3d 488(t); (tax evasion defendant's refusal to read court papers that capitalized his name and his other misbehavior justified the court refusing to reduce the his sentence) US v. M.L. Lindsay (10th Cir 7/1/99) _F3d_, 99 USTC para 50648, 84 AFTR2d 5102; (tax evader complained of "his name being in capital letters in a prior order issued by this Court and then ... makes an incorrect reference to this form of using all capital letters as being proper only in reference to corporate entities.  This is an incorrect statement of the law and ... is illustrative of [his] continued harassing and frivolous behavior."  and fined under Rule 11) Stoecklin v. US (MD Fla unpub 12/8/97);  (claimed that name on indictment is not him but a "fictitious" person because all-caps, "this contention is baseless.") US v.  Washington (SDNY 1996) 947 F.Supp 87; Boyce v.  CIR (9/25/96) TC Memo 1996-439 aff'd (9th Cir unpub 9/4/97);  Brown v. Mueller (ED Mich unpub 6/24/97); Harvard v. Pontesso (6th Cir unpub 8/8/97) 121 F3d 708(t); Gdowik v. US (Bankr.  SD Fla unpub 7/23/96) 78 AFTR2d 6243 aff'd (SD Fla unpub 11/6/97) 228 Bankr.Rptr 481, 80 AFTR2d 8254; State v. Martz (Ohio App unpub 6/9/97); Cole v.  Higgins (D. Ida unpub 1/23/95) 75 AFTR2d 1102 rept adopted (D. Ida unpub 2/27/95) 75 AFTR2d 1479 aff'd (9th Cir 4/1/96) 82 F3d 422(t), 77 AFTR2d 1586; (crank called it "killed on paper") Sadlier v. Payne (D Utah 1997) 974 F.Supp 1411; US v. Frech (10th Cir unpub 6/16/98) 149 F3d 1192(t); In re Shugrue (Bankr., ND Tex 1998) 221 Bankr.Rptr 394; Wyatt v. Kelly, Chief Bankruptcy Judge (WD Texas unpub 3/23/98) 44 USPQ2d 1578, 81 AFTR2d 1463, 98 USTC para 50326 (tried to sue judge for violating his civil rights by having his name printed in court documents in a way other than the "appellation" this crank prefers, crank reacted by refusing to respond to prosecution's complaint whereupon the judge entered a Not Guilty plea on his behalf; suit against judge dismissed) ; Capaldi v.  Pontesso (6th Cir 1998) 135 F3d 1122; US v. Weatherley (ED Penn 1998) 12 F.Supp.2d 469; Russell v.  US (WD Mich 1997) 969 F.Supp 24; ("I believe that not only is this case subject to dismissal .... but it is also subject to sanctions under Rule 11.  Making a distinction between all-capital letters and capital and small letters is frivolous."  litigant tried to deny validity of traffic ticket because it printed the court's name in all-caps) Davis v.  Deddens (SD Ohio unpub 4/18/98); similary (in drug prosecution) US v. Wacker (10th Cir unpub 3/31/99);      {In a  Missouri  arraignment in 1996, "one of the 'freemen' stood up to announce that ... he refused to recognize anything but his 'full Christian name' [evidently not printed in all caps and with some strange punctuation].  This resulted in an unusual scene: An arrest warrant was issued and executed for the defendant's failure to appear at his arraignment even though he was physically present in the courtroom."  J. W. Nixon & E. R. Ardini, Combating Common Law Courts, Criminal Justice, spring  1998, page 14.   In fact, "Christian name" means only the first name and does not include a middle name.  Keene v. Meade (1830) 28 US 1, and Games v. Stiles ex dem Dunn (1840) 39 US 322;  the middle name or initial is not necessarily part of someone's "full"name.  65 CJS "Names" sec. 4 p.5 (1966), 57 Am.Jur.2d "Name" sec. 5 p.654 (1988).  The use of all-caps to set off the names of principals or parties in legal documents is very old, predating the use of typewriters, perhaps to make the names all the more conspicuous in a document otherwise entirely written in copperplate script at a time when a large part of the general public could barely read block lettering.  The UCC 1-201(10) deals with whether some detail is "conspicuous" and says "Language in the body of a form is conspicuous if it is in larger or other contrasting type or color."  In one instance, a federal judge, confronted with a tax scofflaw whose argument consisted of  the fact that all the tax and legal documents spelled his name out in capitals in a normal way while he insisted his name was spelled out with capitals and lower case letters and with punctuation in the middle (i.e. Edgar Francis., Bradley), ordered him  to undergo psychiatric examination (which subsequently found him to be competent to stand trial).  B.L. Kaufman, Judge Orders Defendant Tested, Cincinnati Enquirer, 6/17/98; this ploy ultimately failed.  Assoc.Press, Man and two sons found guilty of tax  fraud (2/3/99); B.L. Kaufman, Three tax evaders are found guilty, Cinc.  Enq., 2/4/99.   The Supreme Ct held  in Grannis v.  Ordean (1914) 234 US 385 at 395,  that "even in names, due process of law does not require ideal accuracy.  In the the spelling and pronunciation of proper names there are no generally accepted standards, and the well-established doctrine of idem sonans ... is recognition of this." In that case a person with the unusual name of Albert Gilfuss ignored the delivery of a summons and court pleadings against "Albert Guilfuss" [presumably typed in all-caps] and the default judgment against him was binding; similarly a misspelling in an indictment, Faust v. US (1896) 163 US 452.    On a related matter, courts have rather emphatically and consistently insisted that pleadings and other court papers be typed and presented in a manner congenial to the judges' preferences (and the court rules), and, for example, courts have forbidden litigants to use certain hard-to-read typefaces; Brown v. Carpenter (WD Tenn 1995) 889 F.Supp 1028; Casas Office Machines Inc. v. Mita Copystar Machines Inc. (D PR 1993) 847 F.Supp 981 vac. on other grounds 42 F3d 668; or typefaces which are smaller than prescribed, or briefs which exceed the prescribed number of pages, etc. etc,, and in many instances courts have rejected the offending paperwork and issued default judgments against the party who violated the stylistic formulae. }  

Use of  punctuation in the midst of name:   US v. Warren (ND NY  unpub 1/22/98); Schneider v. Schlaefer (ED Wisc 1997) 975 F.Supp 1160; Frech v. Incorporated Case (10th Cir unpub 7/24/97); Ex parte Evans (1997) 40 Tex.SupmCt.Jrnl 364, 939 SW2d 142; Smith v. Rubin (10th Cir unpub 3/9/98) 81 AFTR2d 1096, 98 USTC para 50247; Bey v.  Smith (SDNY unpub 8/1/97); Swartzendruber v.  US (WD Mo unpub 4/17/97) (threatened to refuse any court papers that printed her name in the normal way or which were addressed in the normal way, didn't help because her case was immediately dismissed); US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100 (tried to refuse all pleadings and court papers that spelled his name normally); US v. Gamble (ND IL unpub 12/3/96); Bixler v. CIR (7/23/96) TC Memo 1996-329; W.E. Johnson v. Starkey (ED NC unpub 9/3/98) 82 AFTR2d 6950; Tabron v. Starkey (ED NC unpub 8/24/98) 82 AFTR2d 6448; Smith v. Kitchen (10th Cir 1997) 156 F3d 1025, 97 USTC para 50107; Farm Credit Bank of Wichita v. Devous (WD Okl 1996) 933 F.Supp 1028; Farm Credit Bank of Wichita v. Powers (Okla.App 1996) 919 P2d 31; US v. Lerch (ND Ind unpub 3/28/97) 79 AFTR2d 2195; Kish v. CIR (1/13/98) TC Memo 1998-16; Leverenz v. Torluemlu (ND IL unpub 6/13/96); Simon v. Thalken (D Neb unpub 7/17/97) 80 AFTR2d 6281 app.dismissed (D Neb unpub 7/27/97); Dulisse v. Twardowski (ED Penn unpub 7/16/98); DiLouie v. Padova (ED Penn unpub 3/18/98); Lang v. Dieleuterio (D NJ unpub 2/17/99);  In re Busby (MD Fla unpub 10/2/98) 82 AFTR2d 6924 (used colon in midst of name in pleadings, but case caption had normal name); Rosenheck & Co. Inc. v. US ex rel IRS & Kostich (ND Okla unpub 4/9/97) 79 AFTR2d 2715 (court explicitly found that perp was the same person as his name printed in all-caps and without intervening punctuation);   Rodrock v. Foulston (10th Cir unpub 6/12/98) 98 Colo. JCAR 3155; US v. Weatherley (ED Penn 1998) 12 F.Supp.2d 469;  (threatened to sue the court clerk and others if they didn't address all their mail and paperwork to a very strange and long description of him with his name interrupted by a colon and his street address without a zip code) In re Gdowik (Bankr., SD Fla unpub 7/23/96) 78 AFTR2d 6243 aff'd (SD Fla unpub 11/6/97) 228 Bankr.Rptr 481, 80 AFTR2d 8254; (appellant argued that his convictions, for driving without a license or insurance or registration, was invalid solely because the court papers identified him as "Richard E.  Wilson", whereas he claimed his actual name is "Richard Earl., of Wilson" [period after Earl and no capital for Wilson], consisting of his "nomen, pronomen and cognomentation" in that order.  The court rejected this argument, "The caption more than adequately identifies [the] appellant as the party in interest....  and appellant's efforts to distinguish his name from that shown on the caption by means of punctuation and terminology are wholly unpersuasive.") State v. R.E. Wilson (Mont.Supm unpub 12/3/98); approximately the same time an Ohio court rejected the argument that the defendant who had taken to identifying himself as "Jack Edward; Taylor" was not the "Jack Edward Taylor" named in the court documents, especially since there were plenty of old letters and other papers he had signed in the usual way and sometimes without his middle name.  Verdict rebutted on use of semicolon, Cincinnati Enquirer, 12/16/98

 {This affectation - for which there appears to be no historical support, especially since the development of punctuation lagged behind the development of printing or of the English language - occurs in Republic of Texas and many Montana Freemen and other militia-type documents.  In a  Missouri arraignment in 1996, "one of the 'freemen' stood up to announce that ... he refused to recognize anything but his 'full Christian name' [evidently not printed in all caps and with some strange punctuation].  This resulted in an unusual scene: An arrest warrant was issued and executed for the defendant's failure to appear at his arraignment even though he was physically present in the courtroom."  J. W. Nixon & E. R. Ardini, Combating Common Law Courts, Criminal Justice, spring  1998, page 14.   In one instance, a federal judge, confronted with a tax scofflaw whose argument consisted of  the fact that all the tax and legal documents spelled his name out in capitals in a normal way while he insisted his name was spelled out with capitals and lower case letters and with punctuation in the middle (i.e. Edgar Francis., Bradley), ordered him  to undergo psychiatric examination (which subsequently found him to be competent to stand trial).  B. L. Kaufman, Judge Orders Defendant Tested, Cincinnati Enquirer, 6/17/98.  It has been suggested in medical literature that a patient's  use of a meaningless or unpronounceable "glyph" in his name was indicative of psychosis with delusions.  N.  Rendleman, False Names, Western Journal of Medicine, Nov.  1998.   It appears that, in pre-1776 common law, punctuation had no legal significance; acc.  to Husband & Husband, Punctuation (London 1905), the Gutenberg Bible (1456) and all the books of Wm.  Caxton (d.  1491) used only the comma, period, and colon; the Venice printer, Aldus Manutius, wrote a primer on punctuation in 1566 that discussed all these marks and the question mark and parenthesis; in 1617 Ben Johnson wrote about all those marks and also semicolon and exclamation point.  At a time when legislative bodies had bills read aloud to them rather than printed copies furnished to every member, a British court decision held that there were, effectively, no punctuation marks, not even periods, in an Act of Parliament - or at least the punctuation marks had no legal effect, Duke of Devonshire v.  O'Connor (QB 1890) 24 QBD 468 at 478; similarly Manger v.  Bd of State Med.  Examiners (1900) 90 Md 659, 45 Atl.  891 at 893. }

Objection to fringe on flag:  US v. Warren (NDNY  unpub 1/22/98);  Slangal v. Cassel (D Neb 1997) 962 F.Supp 1214 ("I find and conclude that any complaint predicated in whole or in part upon the allegation that jurisdiction is based upon 'the American Free Flag of Peace, title 4 USC 1' ... or a similar allegation is frivolous, malicious and intended to harass.  The plaintiff or anyone else who has filed ... such a 'flag' suit is notified that any such suit filed after this date will be dismissed sua sponte without notice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction."); Lee v. Maass (1992) 111 Ore App 412, 826 P2d 97 revw denied 313 Ore 210, 830 P2d 596; Vella v. McCammon (SD Tex 1987) 671 F.Supp 1128 ("not only without merit but also totally frivolous"); State v. Whalen (Ariz.App 1997) 192 Ariz 103, 961 P2d 1051 app.denied (Ariz Supm unpub 9/10/98); Bartrug v. Rubin (ED Va 1997) 986 F.Supp 332; Commonwealth v. Appel (1994) 438 Penn.Super. 214, 652 A2d 341; State v. Svee (unpub 1/12/88) 143 Wisc.2d 892(t), 421 NW2d 117(t); Sadlier v. Payne (D Utah 1997) 974 F.Supp 1411; McCann v. Greenway (WD Mo 1997) 952 F.Supp 647 ("Jurisdiction is a matter of law, statute, and constitution, not a child’s game wherein one’s power is magnified or diminished by the display of some magic talisman." and quoting the 34 Op. US Atty-Gen 483 [1925] that "In flag manufacture a fringe is not considered to be a part of the flag and it is without heraldic significance." and citing most other published court cases on this topic); Schneider v. Schlaefer (ED Wisc 1997) 975 F.Supp 1160 (quoting McCann case and Atty-Gen Op and "from this day forward litigants ... are put on notice that any claims or defenses based upon the alleged pre-eminence of the ‘American Flag of Peace’ over any other flag are frivolous and sanctionable."); Moeller v. D’Arrigo (ED Va 1995) 163 FRD 489; ("As to the physical composition of the flag in the courtroom, the General Services Administration and the Administrative Office of the Courts supply furnishings for the courtroom.  Defendants should address any complaints about the form of the courtroom flag to the General Services Administration.") US v. G.D. Bell (ED Cal unpub 4/30/97) 79 AFTR2d 2784 recons.den (ED Cal 1998)  27 F.Supp.2d 1191;  R. Jones v. T.G. Watson (ND Ohio unpub 9/29/97); Murray v. State of Wyoming (10th Cir unpub 3/16/99) 176 F3d 489(t)("This argument is indisputably meritless.");  ("Federal jurisdiction is determined by statute, not by whether the flag flown is plain or fringed.") US v. Schiefen (D SoDak 1995) 926 F.Supp 877 aff’d 81 F3d 166 mand.denied 522 US 1074; ("Such objections to the court's flag, or even to the absence of any flag, have uniformly been dismissed as meritless because the type of flag displayed does not affect federal jurisdiction.") Lang v. Dieleuterio (D NJ unpub 2/17/99); Hancock v. State of Utah (10th Cir unpub 5/10/99) 176 F3d 488(t);  R. Miller v. USA (ND Ohio unpub 2/6/98); R. Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96); US v. Dunkel (ND IL unpub 8/30/96) 78 AFTR2d 6529 rev. in part on other grnds (7th Cir unpub 7/1/97) 80 AFTR2d 5148, 97 USTC para  50565; Jarboe v. Reichle (Conn.Super. unpub 11/10/86)(claiming that "the presence of an alleged gold fringed military flag in the courtroom indicates this [state] court is not a constitutional court."); State v. Martz (Ohio App. unpub 6/9/97) app.dismissed 80 Ohio St.3d 1423, 685 NE2d 237 ("Appellant claims the trial court was without jurisdiction ... because the courtroom displayed a military style US flag with gold fringe.  We disagree."); (claimed the fringe on the American flag "the court was thus a foreign power, and the trial judge was the supreme ruler of a foreign power, devoid of any jurisdiction over him")  City of Belton v Horton (Mo.App 1997) 947 SW2d 104; similarly Wacker v. Crow (10th Cir unpub 7/1/99); (this one said that fringe on the flag made it a militiary court) Jarboe v. Reichle (Conn.Super. unpub 11/10/86); (the defendant's objection to the fringed flag was emphasized by the prosecution during cross-examination, and similarly during the cross-examination of the defendant's fellow militia group members, and on appeal the exploitation of the defendant's objection to the courtroom flag was held to be so prejudicial, because it was calculated to arouse the jury's hostility to the defendant, that the conviction was overturned) G.D. Fowler v. State (Ark.App 1999) 67 Ark.App 114, 992 SW2d 804;  (suing federal judges, IRS agents and US Attorney for constructive treason, etc. because of fringed flag) Dulisse v. Twardowski (ED Penn unpub 7/16/98); (similarly "this Court is persuaded that the American Flag statute cannot be relied on as a jurisdictional basis for a [civil rights] action."  Rule 11 sanctions imposed) Dunkel v.  McCloskey (ED Penn unpub 11/25/98);  Haskins v. Wilbert (D Kan unpub 11/5/97) ("Judge Wilbert's jurisdiction is in no way predicated on ... the design of the US flag."); US v. Greenstreet (ND Tex 1996) 912 F.Supp 224 ("decor is not a determinant for jurisdiction"); Huebner v. State (Tex.App unpub 5/8/97); State v. Martz (Ohio App unpub 6/9/97); (tried to sue judge for not removing fringed flag nor installing "a flag that met plaintiffs' specifications"; court imposed Rule 11 fine of $1000) Wyatt v. Kelly, Chief Bankruptcy Judge (WD Texas unpub 3/23/98) 44 USPQ2d 1578, 81 AFTR2d 1463, 98 USTC para 50326; (trying to sue a town official and a judge for "accepting" a fringed US flag supposedly thereby "suppressing" the perp's rights)  Marion v. Marion (Conn.Super. unpub 6/18/98); similarly (suing federal judges, US Attorneys, county registrars, IRS agents, and some big corporations because of fringed flag.  "The complaint will be dismissed not because this court operates under the regal splendor of a gold fringed flag but because the complaint is legally absurd.") Ch.H. Cass v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co (MDNC unpub 10/1/98) 82 AFTR2d 6967; ditto J.  Rogers v.  Borough of Manhattan (a person) (SDNY unpub 10/1/98); ditto (claimed the presence of a fringed flag denied him a fair trial and constituted treason) Joyner v. Borough of Brooklyn (EDNY unpub 3/18/99);   {Oddly enough in a 1972 prosecution for desecration of the US flag, the defendant - charged for wearing a minature flag sewn to the seat of his pants - attempted to introduce the testimony of a flag expert, described by the court as "a so-called vexillologist", (who, evidently on cross-examination, testified that the patch flag "conformed to official standards"), but the court ruled that it was not necessary for the flag to have qualified as an official flag meeting the dimensions and proportions set forth in a Presidential Executive Order for purchase and use  by federal agencies in order for the jury to convict under the flag desecration law. Goguen v. Smith (D Mass 1972) 343 F.Supp 161 aff'd (on other grounds) 471 F2d 88 aff'd 415 US 566.}  In a criminal trial, the judge was within his authority to order the prosecutor to remove his American flag lapel pin, for fear of arousing the prejudices of the jury during the height of the Gulf War. Montgomery v. Muller (1992) 176 App.Div.2d 29, 580 NYS2d 110

same result for objection to eagle on flagpole:  Sadlier v. Payne (D Utah 1997) 974 F.Supp 1411; McCann v. Greenway (WD Mo 1997) 952 F.Supp 647; Schneider v. Schlaefer (ED Wisc 1997) 975 F.Supp 1160 (all three quoting the 1925 US Atty-Gen Opinion); similarly for anything yellow on tip of flagpole.  Dulisse v.  Twardowski (ED Penn unpub 7/16/98).  {The nitwits have amongst themselves this strange superstition that the presence of a gold trim on a courtroom's flag somehow imposes some different sort of law than what's expected -- although they cannot get their stories straight on whether it's martial law or maritime law, the two being very different.  They have absolutely no legal authority for any of this and seem to be making it up as they go along.  They don't seem to have noticed that the gold trim appears only on INDOOR flags, which are made of fairly flimsy material and would hang limp and drab without either breeze or sunlight indoors, so the gold trim provides some esthetic compensation for the lack of sunlight and breeze, and that all OUTDOOR flags, even the ones at military bases and on ships, don't have this fringe, because outdoor flags are made of heavier fabric and the wind and damp would soon ruin a fringe.  Back in 1925 the US Attorney-General relied on the opinion of the predecessor to the US Army's Institute of Heraldry that the fringe was not an addition or alteration of the flag, and therefore not  illegal, and moreover had no symbolic  meaning.  Currently the Institute of Heraldry and the non-government Flag Research Center both issue fact sheets debunking this militia myth about the fringe on the flag.  There apparently has NEVER been a successful challenge to a court's decision or jurisdiction based on the absence of a correct flag or the presence of an "incorrect" flag in the courtroom. }

Lawsuits claiming "the American Flag of Peace" (="AFoP") as a cause of action or basis of jurisdiction:   Haskins v. Wilbert (D Kan unpub 11/5/97) ("Judge Wilbert's jurisdiction [in municipal traffic court] is in no way predicated on 4 USC sec. 1, which sets out  the design of the US flag."); Miller v.  IRS (D. Neb unpub 9/22/97) 80 AFTR2d 8169;(without explicitly mentioning a gold fringe, tried to sue Sec.  of Treasury, judge in tax case, and IRS employees for having brought and decided tax fraud case "under the American War Flag without a cause under the AFoP".  "However there are no fact alleged which establish that these acts are violative of a 'clearly established  Constitutional right'.") Bartrug v.  Rubin (ED Va 1997) 986 F.Supp 332; Hovind v.  Kelly (ND Fla unpub 3/17/97) 79 AFTR2d 1650; Jones v.  Watson (ND Ohio unpub 2/4/97); US v. Klimek (ED Penn 1997) 952 F.Supp 1100; Goode v.  Foster (D Kan unpub 9/27/96);  R. Miller v. Gallagher (ND Ohio unpub 12/17/96); Leverenz v. Torluemlu (ND IL unpub 6/13/96); (The perp's "pleading, as with others, fails to address the merits of anything ... [instead] it again represents a rambling discourse of the plaintiff's view of the law under the 'AFoP', whatever that may be.") R. Miller v. US (ND Ohio unpub 11/26/96) 78 AFTR2d 7547; (criminal defendant attempted to set aside conviction by suing judge and bailiff for torts including claim that, during the trial, the judge had the bailiff  remove the defendant's "AFoP" from the presence of the jury -- presumably some miniature flag brought in by the defendant) Gipson v. Callahan (WD Tex 1997) 18 F.Supp.2d 662 app.dism 157 F3d 903(t); (plaintiff claimed "jurisdiction of AFoP" and thereafter refused to respond to opposition's pleadings; case dismissed) Miller v.  IRS (D.Neb unpub 9/22/97) 80 AFTR2d 8169; (refused court papers, "This Refusal filed under the AFoP") Humphrey v.  Decker (ED Wash 1997) 173 FRD 529;

Nuisance liens;    --  enjoined:   (In one of the earliest instances, tax scofflaws who filed several different liens against an IRS agent was permanently enjoined from filing any sort of encumbrance agaianst any federal employee in any jurisdiction without first getting permission from a court, the existing liens were annulled, with instructions that copies of this decision should be posted in various recorders officers, and imposing a substantial fine) US v. Wagner (WD Wash unpub 4/12/94);  US v. Lindbloom (WD Wash unpub  4/16/97) 79 AFTR2d 2578, 97 USTC para 50650; US v. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 12/9/97) 131 F3d 152(t), 80 AFTR2d 8258; Eismann v. Miller (1980) 101 Ida 692, 619 P2d 1145; US v. Moore (ND Okl unpub 9/7/93) 72 AFTR2d 6277, 93 USTC para  50653 aff’d 21 F3d 1122, 73 AFTR2d 1656;  US v. Marsh a.k.a. Pilot (D Nev unpub 2/14/96) 77 AFTR2d 1069; Beard v. CIR (1984) 82 Tax Ct 766 (nr. 60) aff’d (6th Cir 1986) 793 F2d 139; US v. Greenstreet (ND Tex 1996) 912 F.Supp 224; US v. Hart (DND 1982) 545 F.Supp 470 aff’d 701 F2d 749; US v. Shanahan (WD Wash unpub 8/27/97);  Ch.H. Cass v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co (MDNC unpub 10/1/98) 82 AFTR2d 6967 (injunction did not violate perp's civil rights); Ryan v. Bilby (9th Cir 1985) 764 F2d 1325 (IRS employees, judges, magistrates and US prosecutor involved in tax case all immune from perp’s liens and lawsuits); US v. Van Dyke (D Ore 1983) 568 F.Supp 820 ("The 'Common Law Liens' are primitive affairs, basically consisting of captions such as 'Common Law lien on the Property and Hand Signature of the Following Persons', followed by a list of people.  There is no explanation of how the 'lien' arose, not a recital of any legal action pending or concluded against the named parties.  Tax protestors apparently obtain the names and addresses of the employees of the IRS and other federal employees and file these 'liens' out of spite.... The so-called liens are of course invalid and of no legal force or effect. However, they are used ... to harass IRS employees and deter them from enforcing the tax laws."); (liens and "posse comitatus common law great charter") US v. Hart (D ND 1982) 545 F.Supp 470 aff’d (8th Cir 1983) 701 F2d 749; US v. Laeger (WD La unpub 1996) 77 AFTR2d 2123 (filing with registrar a so-called "declaration in trespass" against named IRS employees treated as if a nuisance lien even though the "trespass" document has no legal significance); (mailing bogus liens to county recorder enjoined as mail fraud) US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98); US v. Potter (ED Mich unpub 7/29/97) 80 AFTR2d 6041, 97 USTC para 50762 aff'd (6th Cir unpub 12/18/98) 172 F3d 874(t), 99 USTC para 50161, 83 AFTR2d 305  (filed "American Citizens liens" which "admittedly harassed ... federal officials in an attempt to prevent their enforcement of internal revenue laws" and "thereby imposed irreparable harm on them"); US v. Haggard (D Me unpub 2/12/96) 77 AFTR2d 1309 ("an unlawful attempt to interfere with the enforcement of the internal revenue laws of the United States"); ("Such attempts to torment federal employees due to their participation in the enforcement of federal criminal laws cannot and will not be tolerated."  Prisoner who filed liens against the judge and prosecutor was ordered to release the liens or else federal marshals would remove the liens) US v. Poole (CD IL 1996) 916 F.Supp 861; ditto (and enjoined from filing any future liens against current or former federal officials without court permission) US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98); ditto (explicitly referring to bogus liens against a former IRS auditor) US v.  Scott (ND Ind unpub 2/4/98) 81 AFTR2d 1076 judgmt entered (ND Ind unpub 10/8/98); ditto US v. McKinley (10th Cir 1995) 53 F3d 1170 (filed "Citizen-Customer Just Compensation Liens" against the federal  judge and prosecutor in pending case against him.  His lien papers contained such statements as "You are my public servant and I am your citizen-customer, and ... I have the commercial power to enforce your specific performance with a Commercial Just Compensation Customer's Lien .... Your relationshhip to me as a public servant, and your oath of office, give me consent to file consensual commerceial liens against you.... Your oath of office and your consequen public responsibility as a public servant, when violated by you, are my commercial authority to file a Just Compensation Lien against you...   You will comply .. and rectify the lien claimant's problem or you will lose your property."  Nullified on the motion of the govt,  "it is a power that has no mooring in either federal or state law.  The liens, in any event, purport to secure assets to which [he] would have no legal claim even were his civil rights action to succeed."); similarly US v. Barker (SD Ga 1998) 19 F.Supp.2d 1380 ("neither federal nor state law provides that a citizen may file a lien on the property of a public official for alleged wrongs committed by that official against the citizen without the existence of a judgment in the citizen's favors.  The citizen must first take his grievance to court ...."; that these documents are titled "Non-statutory, non-judicial, non-summary-disposable UCC commercial paper/liens" practically admits that they are baseless);  similarly US v. Willenberg (9th Cir unpub 8/9/94) 74 AFTR2d 5930; (enjoined not only against filing liens but from any other contact with IRS employees except at the IRS offices) US v. MacElvain (MD Alab 1994) 858 F.Supp 1096 aff'd (11th Cir 1995) 68 F3d 486(t); (enjoined under any of the many titles used in the documents, including "solemn recognition of mixed war" and "writ of attachment") US v. Trowbridge (D Ida unpub 9/13/93) aff’d (9th Cir 1994) 43 F3d 1480(t); similarly (so-called "UCC-4 Non-Negotiable ‘True Bill’ Private Agreement" lien filed with county clerk and "Citizens Warrant for Citizens Arrest" sent to IRS employees) US v. Moore (ND Okl unpub 9/7/93) 72 AFTR2d 6277, 93 USTC para 50653 aff’d (10th Cir 1994) 21 F3d 1122(t), 73 AFTR2d 1656; US v. Knudson (D Neb 1997) 959 F.Supp 1180; US v. Ekblad (7th Cir 1984) 732 F2d 562;  US v. Andra (D Ida 1996) 923 F.Supp 157; US v. Lerch (ND Ind unpub 3/28/97) 79 AFTR2d 2195; Greenstreet v. Heiskell (Tex.App 1997) 940 SW2d 831 reh.den 960 SW2d 713; US v. Kaun (ED Wis 1986) 633 F.Supp 406 aff'd 827 F2d 1144; (Pilot Connection Society criminally prosecuted for promoting its tax evasion scheme including instructions to try to get IRS employees arrested or making citizen's arrests of IRS employees) US v. Clark (5th Cir 1998) 139 F3d 485 cert.den _US_, 119 S.Ct 227; actually making a "citizen's arrest" of an IRS agent prosecuted and convicted, with 3 yrs imprisonment, under 18 USC 111 for assaulting, intimidating or interfering with a federal officer in performance of duties.  US v.  Pazsint (9th Cir 1983) 703 F2d 420 aff'd after remand (9th Cir 1984) 728 F2d 411;   (sending such an arrest warrant relating to a federal judge, even one who has already recused himself from a pending case, will be punished severely as obstruction of justice and interfering with a federal officer) US v.  Fulbright (9th Cir 1997) 105 F3d 443 cert.den 520 US 1236; US v. Criswell (D Ore unpub 8/31/95) 76 AFTR2d 6481 (district ct empowered to enjoin perp from filing any more liens against IRS employees by 26 USC sec. 7402(a), which authorizes any orders necessary to enforce the tax laws); ditto (clerks and recorders instructed not to accept documents titled "common law liens" and "common law writs of attachment", or if these are filed these should be ignored as null and void)  Saenger v. Brown (D Ore unpub 5/3/88) 61 AFTR2d 1240, 88 USTC para 9404; ditto US v. Van Skiver (D Kan unpub 12/13/90) 71A AFTR2d 4063, 91 USTC para 50017 aff'd US v. Kettler [& Van Skiver](10th Cir unpub 6/3/91) 934 F2d 326(t); ditto US v. Lutz (ED Ky unpub 7/1/94) 74 AFTR2d 5517, 94 USTC para 50553 ("Therefore, this court, as with every court to have considered this issue, determines that injunctive and declaratory relief is appropriate ....");  similarly (perp quibbled that his "commercial liens" were somehow different from other perps’ "common law liens" but court invalidated and enjoined them, plus some other forms such as "solemn recognition of mixed war" and "affidavit of criminal complaint", all the same) US v. Trowbridge (D Ida unpub 7/16/93) aff’d (9th Cir unpub 1994) 43 F3d 1480(t); ditto US v. Haggert (D Me unpub 2.12.96) 77 AFTR2d 1309; (also invalidated and enjoined the filing of documents, not only liens but "notices" of criminal accusations against IRS employees and the like) US v. Kettler [& Van Skiver](10th Cir unpub 6/3/91) 934 F2d 326(t); "common law liens" are only available against personal property not real property and only for a creditor in possession, law does not recognized a lien arising from "unlawful actions", and enjoined attempts to file nuisance lien against property of federal judge and his family without first obtaining approval of another federal judge.  Moore v. Surles (ED NC 1987) 673 F.Supp 1398; similarly (in Wisc., a common law lien exists only "where a person bestows labor upon an article or does some act with reference to that article... This, of course, has nothing to do with the present situation....") Peth v. Breitzman (ED Wis 1985) 611 F.Supp 50; similarly ("Where there is no debt, ... in the absence of a law, a lien cannot exist.  An examination of the record before us does not reveal any debt in existence .... Terpstra has merely filed a tort claim ... which has yet to proceed to judgment. A pre-judgment tort claim is not a debt and to treat it as such would be improper. ... In cases of common-law liens, in order that such a lien may be kept alive, it is absolutely essential that the person claiming the lien should retain and hold an idependent and exclusive possession of the particular chattel.  Whenever he voluntarily surrenders its possession his lien is lost .... It appears then, that in order for Terpstra to have a valid common-law lien, two elements are necessary - - debt and possession.  In the instant case, both elements are missing....  Today common law liens are creatures of statute, and, when there is no express statute authorizing a lien on land, an instrument purporting to do so is void.") Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchants Bank (Ind.App 1985) 483 NE2d 749;  similarly (and there is no legal authority for asserting that the Constitution authorizes a so-called common law lien) US v.  Lerch (ND Ind unpub 3/28/97) 79 AFTR2d 2195

  -- invalidated:   US v. Lindbloom (WD Wash unpub 4/16/97) 79 AFTR2d 2578, 97 USTC para 50650; Eismann v. Miller (1980) 101 Ida 692, 619 P2d 1145; US v. Marsh a.k.a. Pilot (D Nev unpub 2/14/96) 77 AFTR2d 1069; Beard v. CIR (1984) 82 Tax Ct 766 (nr. 60) aff’d (6th Cir 1986) 793 F2d 139; US v. Greenstreet (ND Tex 1996) 912 F.Supp 224; Simmons v. CIR (6/16/97) TC Memo 1997-269; US v. Hart (DND 1982) 545 F.Supp 470 aff’d 701 F2d 749; Ryan v. Bilby (9th Cir 1985) 764 F2d 1325; US v. Boos [& Gunwall] (10th Cir unpub 1/14/99) 166 F3d 1222(t), 83 AFTR2d 584 cert.den _US_, 119 S.Ct 1795 (and subsequently prosecuted) ; US v. Frlekin (9th Cir unpub 1/19/95) 46 F3d 1147(t), 75 AFTR2d 841 (and appealing the nullification of a bogus lien on an IRS agent's property was so obviously frivolous as to get a $1500 fine);  Ch.H. Cass v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co (MDNC unpub 10/1/98) 82 AFTR2d 6967  (invalidation of nuisance liens did not violate perp's civil rights); US v. Van Dyke (D Ore 1983) 568 F.Supp 820 (tax protesters attempted to file against IRS employees something called "hand signature liens" which "supposedly ... have mystical power to prevent the target individuals from signing letters, checks, deeds, contracts, and the like", the court also issued a Declaration to be posted in all registrars’s offices that such liens were invalid and not to be accepted); similarly Johnson v. Murray (1982) 201 Mont 495, 656 P2d 170;  US v. Laeger (WD La unpub 1996) 77 AFTR2d 2123 (document filed with registrar resembling a civil or criminal complaint against named IRS employees treated as if a nuisance lien); US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98); US v. Ekblad (7th Cir 1984) 732 F2d 562; Saenger v. Brown (D Ore unpub 5/3/88) 61 AFTR2d 1240, 88 USTC para 9404; US v. Potter (ED Mich unpub 7/29/97) 80 AFTR2d 6041, 97 USTC para 50762 aff'd (6th Cir unpub 12/18/98) 172 F3d 874(t), 99 USTC para 50161, 83 AFTR2d 305; US v. Kettler [& Van Skiver](10th Cir unpub 6/3/91) 934 F2d 326(t); ("Every jurisdiction faced with similar liens have found them of no legal effect") US v. Haggard (D Me unpub 2/12/96) 77 AFTR2d 1309; ditto US v. Barker (SD Ga 1998) 19 F.Supp.2d 1380; similarly US v. McKinley (10th Cir 1995) 53 F3d 1170; (a lien is a security for a debt, where there is no debt a lien cannot exist, and a prejudgment tort claim cannot support a lien, and state circuit court had inherent power to nullify and expunge bogus liens) Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchants Bank (Ind.App 1985) 483 NE2d 749; (noting that the tax protester ignored all the proper remedies and responses to tax audits and bills and resorted to liens against IRS employees)  US v. MacElvain (MD Alab 1994) 858 F.Supp 1096 aff'd (11th Cir 1995) 68 F3d 486(t); ditto in reaction to a $5 traffic ticket (and the enormity of the lien contrasted with the motivation used as evidence of malice, with substantial damages) Johnson v. Murray (1982) 201 Mont 495, 656 P2d 170;  (invalidated under a wide variety of titles) US v. Trowbridge (D Ida unpub 9/13/93) aff’d (9th Cir 1994) 43 F3d 1480(t); similarly US v. Knudson (D Neb 1997) 959 F.Supp 1180; similarly (referring to "any document" indicating that a former IRS agent owed the perp something) US v.  Scott (ND Ind unpub 2/4/98) 81 AFTR2d 1076 judgmt entered (ND Ind unpub 10/8/98); similarly ("UCC-4 non-negotiable true bill private agreement lien") US v. Moore (ND Okl unpub 9/7/93) 72 AFTR2d 6277, 93 USTC para 50653 aff’d (10th Cir 1994) 21 F3d 1122(t), 73 AFTR2d 1656; US v. Hart (D ND 1982) 545 F.Supp 470 aff’d (8th Cir 1983) 701 F2d 749; (rejecting claim that nuisance liens against judge and prosecutor were "commercial" and noting that prisoner admitted he had no judgment debts against them) US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98); ("The so-called 'Notices of Common Law Lien' are worthless scraps of paper and have no legal effect.") Peth v. Breitzman (ED Wis 1985) 611 F.Supp 50;  (rejecting a supposed "social contract" argument that govt employees personally owe him for any dissatisfaction in their performance) US v. McKinley (10th Cir 1995) 53 F3d 1170; ditto US v. Barker (SD Ga 1998) 19 F.Supp.2d 1380;  (filing a document titled "a Security [15 USC] Claim of Commercial Lien and Affidavit")  US v.  R. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 11/22/95) 72 F3d 138(t), 79 AFTR2d 1045;  (Ariz law  enables and requires registrars to "remove" invalid liens and this may be done by adding to the file an official document negating the invalid lien) Purcell v. Superior Court (Ariz.App 1992) 172 Ariz 166, 835 P2d 498; US v. Andra (D Ida 1996) 923 F.Supp 157; US v. Lerch (ND Ind unpub 3/28/97) 79 AFTR2d 2195; Rylander v. Wilkens (ED Calif  unpub 12/13/79) 45 AFTR2d 890, 80 USTC para 9141; ("As other courts have noted, there are appropriate avenues by which taxpayers and bankruptcy litigants may file complaints about govt employees, and the Court cannot condone the filing of bogus, unauthorized liens as some form of protest or means of intimidation."  Court permanently enjoined perp from filing any lien or pleading or other document in either federal or state court without first obtaining court approval and ordered the clerk to refuse any submission that was not approved.)  US v.  Lerch (ND Ind unpub 9/10/98) 82 AFTR2d 6520, 98 USTC para 50752;  (order invalidating nuisance liens against certain IRS employees also instructed registrars to photocopy and post a copy of the court order to prevent any future attempts to file such liens by the same perp or against the same employees)  US v. Criswell (D Ore unpub 8/31/95) 76 AFTR2d 6481; ditto US v. Lutz (ED Ky unpub 7/1/94) 74 AFTR2d 5517, 94 USTC para 50553 (perp called his fictitious liens "consensual liens", which they clearly were not); ditto US v. Shanahan (WD Wash unpub 8/27/97) (perp called them "commercial liens"); (in a non-political case, lis pendens filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants while a suit for money damages was pending were immediately expunged by the court, with a scolding, as lis pendens are applicable only where the encumbered property itself is at issue) Bly v. Gensmer (Minn.App 1986) 386 NW2d 767; (attempt to extract money from IRS employees by sending them UCC-style Demand for Payment, and then trying to enforce same in court) Cole v.  Higgins (D Ida unpub 1/23/95) 75 AFTR2d 1102 rept adopted by (D Ida unpub 2/27/95) 75 AFTR2d 1479 aff'd  (9th Cir 1996) 82 F3d 422(t), 77 AFTR2d 1586; (sending IRS agents his UCC-style Demand letters followed by a summons from Our One Supreme Court justifies the very severe punishment set for "terrorists") US v. J.V. Wells (4th Cir 1998) 163 F3d 889; (federal court may instruct state or county recorder to remove fictitious liens) US v. Van Skiver (D Kan unpub 12/13/90) 71-A  AFTR2d 4063, 91 USTC para 50017 aff'd US v. Kettler [& Van Skiver](10th Cir unpub 6/3/91) 934 F2d 326(t); US v. Knudson (D Neb 1997) 959 F.Supp 1180; Moore v. Surles (ED NC 1987) 673 F.Supp 1398; Rylander v. Wilkens (ED Calif  unpub 12/13/79) 80 USTC para 9141, 45 AFTR2d 890;  ditto ("It is by now established beyond dispute that the US may request the assistance of Art.III courts to protect its officials from attempts at harassment, intimidation, and extortion in the form of 'liens'.") US v. Barker (SD Ga 1998) 182 FRD 661; (where a prisoner had filed bogus liens against the federal judge and prosecutor in his trial and even against his own defense lawyer, the federal court could invalidate and order the removal of all the liens, even the one against the defense lawyer who was not a federal employee)  US v. Poole (CD IL 1996) 916 F.Supp 861; cf. (federal court may order removal of improper lis pendens)  Texas Extrusion Corp v. Lockheed Corp (5th Cir 1988) 844 F2d 1142 cert.den 488 US 926; similarly (federal Bankruptcy judge could nullify nuisance lien filed against a state judge by the bankruptcy petitioner; moreover the petitioner's use of a bogus lien against a judge was sufficient grounds to deny a motion for forma pauperis) In re J.M. Anderson (Bankr., WD Mich 1991) 130 Bankr.Rptr 497; (court invalidated perp's filings which purported to "release" liens that had been validly filed against them by the IRS) US v. Van Skiver (D Kan unpub 12/13/90) 71A AFTR2d 4063, 91 USTC para 50017 aff'd US v. Kettler [& Van Skiver](10th Cir unpub 6/3/91) 934 F2d 326(t); (cannot pretend that a lien has become "consensual" because the victim did not respond to the perp's deadlines and threats) US v.  Andra (D Ida 1996) 923 F.Supp 157; similarly (because UCC is inapplicable to IRS, the failure of the IRS to respond to the perp's UCC-type demands within his deadline does not constitute a default or admission)  Holling v. US (ED Mich unpub 11/27/95) 76 AFTR2d 6968, magistrate's recommendation (ED Mich unpub 2/6/96) 77 AFTR2d 1052, sanctions imposed (Ed Mich 5/17/96) 934 F.Supp 251; in the case of a prison inmate who filed bogus liens against the judge, prosecutor and even his own lawyer, the federal court declared all the liens (even the one against his own lawyer) invalid and ordered him to release the liens or else federal marshals would remove the liens.  US v. Poole (CD IL 1996) 916 F.Supp 861; (explicitly referring to bogus liens against a former IRS auditor) US v.  Scott (ND Ind unpub 2/4/98) 81 AFTR2d 1076 judgmt entered (ND Ind unpub 10/8/98);

[(on a slightly different note, held that the recording of a title document -- such as a lien -- with the county recorder does not imbue it with any additional authenticity or validity, the document is as valid or invalid as before, but only imparts public notice) Shirk v. Thomas (1889) 121 Ind 147, 22 NE 976, 16 Am.St.Rep 381; cf (where defendant wrote up his own title document to land he had never owned, recorded this document and then attempted to sell the land) Industrial Devel. Bd of Tullahoma v. Hancock (Tenn.App 1995) 901 SW2d 382; (the recorder of deeds is a creation of statute and therefore cannot be compelled to do, nor sued for not doing, something not authorized by law) Federal Intermediate Credit Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co. (1935) 194 Minn 150, 259 NW 793 (e.g. not issuing a document not required by law); State ex rel Ashton v. Register of Deeds (1880) 26 Minn 521, 6 NW 337 (e.g., for refusing to accept a deed which lacks the certificate required by law that shows all taxes have been paid); in some states the recorders have been given explicit instructions from the courts or the atty-general or by statute to refuse certain items: (e.g. documents from "Our One Supreme Court", or sham liens especially against govt employees) Nash v. McIntosh (1997) 328 So.Car 76, 492 SE2d 75; Texas Atty-Gen Letter Op 97-14 (2/28/97); Texas Atty-Gen Op. DM-389 (5/2/96); Texas Atty-Gen Letter Op 98-16 (3/13/98); Wash.Atty-Gen 1996 Opinion nr. 12 (7/31/96); 1996 Ohio Atty-Gen Opinions 69, nr.  96-19 (3/14/96); Opinion of Nebraska Atty-Gen, nr.  233 (11/2/84); Calif. Civil Code sec. 765.010 (amended 1997); So.Car. Code Ann. sec. 30-9-35 (amended 1998); 12 Okla. Statutes sec. 1533 (amended 1997); Ore.Rev.Stat. sec. 205.455 (amended 1997); and many more]

  -- penalized:   US v. Bailey (10th Cir 12/9/97) 131 F3d 152 (t), 80 AFTR2d 8258 (5 yrs probation, revoked when he was caught for not filing tax returns for two years); (wrote up liens against traffic cop, traffic judges, and others, with their forged signatures and a fake seal and then offered to remove the liens if  they would undo the suspension of his license; convicted of attempted criminal syndicalism and several counts of fraud) State v. Whalen (Ariz.App 1997) 192 Ariz 103,  961 P2d 1051 app.denied (Ariz Supm unpub 9/10/98); US v. Kuball (9th Cir 1992) 976 F2d 529, 70 AFTR2d 6080, 92 USTC para  50501;   State v. Stephenson (1998) 89 Wash.App 794, 950 P2d 38 (prosecuted as threatening a govt employee); Beard v. CIR (1984) 82 Tax Ct 766 (nr. 60) aff’d (6th Cir 1986) 793 F2d 139; Ryan v. Bilby (9th Cir 1985) 764 F2d 1325; US v. Hart (8th Cir 1983) 701 F2d 749; US v. Greenstreet (ND Tex 1996) 912 F.Supp 224; US v. McKinley (10th Cir 1995) 53 F3d 1170; US v. Boos [& Gunwall] (10th Cir unpub 1/14/99) 166 F3d 1222(t), 83 AFTR2d 584 cert.den _US_, 119 S.Ct 1795  (both the pretended creditor and the purported intermediary who prepared and filed the lien for him charged and convicted of impeding federal employees in their duties and of obstructing the administration of the revenue laws);  US v. Potter (ED Mich unpub 7/29/97) 80 AFTR2d 6041, 97 USTC para 50762 aff'd (6th Cir unpub 12/18/98) 172 F3d 874(t), 99 USTC para 50161, 83 AFTR2d 305 (required perps to list all the federal employees against whom they had filed "American Citizens liens", and list all the other offices where liens had been filed, and further required to pay all costs and to submit proof of compliance); US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98) (because a lien is a claim, and this against federal employees for their official acts it become a claim against the federal govt, nuisance lien is prosecuted under the False Claims Act); (because the liens were groundless and intended only for harassment or extortion, mailing the liens to the county recorder was prosecuted and enjoined as mail fraud)  US v. Anderson (ND IL unpub 9/25/98); (convicted of corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the administration of the tax laws, 26 USC 7212)  US v. MacElvain (MD Alab 1994) 858 F.Supp 1096 aff'd (11th Cir 1995) 68 F3d 486(t); similarly (punished as obstruction of justice)  US v. Koff (9th Cir 1994) 43 F3d 417 cert.den 514 US 1008; similarly US v. Winchell (10th Cir 1997) 129 F3d 1093 (perp sent IRS employees letters claiming to have filed nuisance liens against them, even though no such liens had actually been filed he was convicted); similarly (filing bogus "common law" liens against individual IRS employees not protected as "petitioning govt" under First Amendment)  US v. Reeves (5th Cir 1986) 782 F2d 1323 cert.den 479 US 837; similarly (cannot pretend that the lien was "to force [the IRS employee] to act within the scope of her authority" because "even if we were to find that agent ... had been acting outside of the scope of her duties - which we do not - it would still not provide a basis for the filing of a lien against her property.") US v. Frlekin (9th Cir unpub 1/19/95) 46 F3d 1147(t), 75 AFTR2d 841;  similarly (cannot excuse bogus lien as being a preliminary to an anticipated civil suit, esp since the suit would have to be against the govt generally and not this individual employee and the pretext of the suit is hopeless) US v. Reeves (5th Cir 1985) 752 F2d 995 cert.den 474 US 834 and conviction upheld after remand (5th Cir 1986) 782 F2d 1323 cert.den 479 US 837;  similarly US v. Trowbridge (9th Cir unpub 3/26/97) 110 F3d 71(t) cert.den 520 US 1235;  similarly (under 26 USC 7212) one count for each bogus lien.  US v.  R. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 11/22/95) 72 F3d 138(t), 79 AFTR2d 1045;  (fined) US v. Knudson (D Neb 1997) 959 F.Supp 1180; US v. Ekblad (7th Cir 1984) 732 F2d 562; US v. Moore (ND Okl unpub 9/7/93) 72 AFTR2d 6277, 93 USTC para 50653 aff’d (10th Cir 1994) 21 F3d 1122(t), 73 AFTR2d 1656; Greenstreet v. Heiskell (Tex.App 1997) 940 SW2d 831 reh.den 960 SW2d 713; Rylander v. Wilkens (ED Calif unpub 12/13/79) 45 AFTR2d 890, 80 USTC para 9141; (bankruptcy petitioner's filing of bogus lien against a state judge was sufficient grounds to deny motion for forma pauperis) In re J.M. Anderson (Bankr., WD Mich 1991) 130 Bankr.Rptr 497; (ordered to pay atty's fees for victims of his liens and further ordered that he must be represented by a lawyer if he ever commences another lawsuit) People v. Dunlap (Colo. 1981) 623 P2d 408; (ordered to pay $1000 per day to the victim until the lien is removed; held that the lien was groundless because "a groundless document is one as to which a proponent can advance no rational argument based on evidence or law to support his claim of a lien" and in this instance filing liens to coerce compliance with an invalid or non-existence contract meets that description, and this applies even if the contract appeared valid when the lien was first filed but the defendant refused to remove or cancel the lien when the contract ceased to be valid) Harris v.  Hanson (Colo.App 1991) 821 P2d 821; (ordered to pay attorneys costs for the govt lawyer who represented several govt employees who had all been the target of bogus liens) Rylander v. Wilkens (ED Calif  unpub 12/13/79) 80 USTC para 9141, 45 AFTR2d 890; (held that US Attorney may bring action against perp who filed fictitious liens against federal employees) US v.  Bey (6th Cir unpub 6/18/98) 149 F3d 1185(t); "Filing a false UCC form, or issuing an illegitimate arrest warrant is prohibited -- the statutes are not impermissibly vague as applied." US v.  Fulbright (9th Cir 1997) 105 F3d 443 cert.den 520 US 1236; 26 USC 7212 (interference with the administration of the internal revenue laws) is constitutional and not void for vagueness. US v. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 11/22/95) 79 AFTR2d 1045; the perp's behavior, during his criminal trial for obstruction of justice for fictitious liens against IRS employees, of persisting to dispute the legitimacy of the income tax laws justifies the court's imposing a maximum sentence. US v. Bailey (10th Cir unpub 11/22/95) 79 AFTR2d 1045; (two months jail for "indirect criminal contempt" for filing nuisance liens and false 1099s against traffic court judge) People v. Smeathers (1998) 297 IL App.3d 711, 698 NE2d 18; penalized under Fed Rule of Civil Proc 11.  Moore v. Surles (ED NC 1987) 673 F.Supp 1398; (conspirators who filed bogus liens against IRS employees convicted of both impeding or injuring federal officers in their duties, 18 USC 372, and with corruptly obstructing the internal revenue laws, 26 USC 7212) US v. Boos [& Gunwall] (10th Cir unpub 1/14/99) 166 F3d 1222(t), 83 AFTR2d 584 cert.den _US_, 119 S.Ct 1795;  the criminal prosecution for filing a fictitious lien does not require that the document must appear to trained lawyers to be a properly drafted lien, and it is sufficient to prosecute if the document filed merely purported to be an encumbrance on property even though it was amateurish and defective.  (in these two Colorado cases the document was not even titled a Lien but "Notice of Equity Interest and Claim")  People v.  Marston (Colo.Supm  1989) 772 P2d 615; ditto People v.  Forgey (Colo.Supm  1989) 770 P2d 781 cert.den 493 US 839; ditto (convicted of criminal slander of title, with two years of prison, for filing lis pendens and "common law liens" against various parcels of land amounting to every piece of property in town)  State v. Minniecheske (1984) 118 Wis.2d 357, 347 NW2d 610; similarly  (lawyer disciplined for filing a lis pendens against real property as part of a lawsuit which did not involve title to that property) In re Bowen (1989) 160 Ariz 558, 774 P2d 1348; (lawyer disbarred for filing a fraudulent lien, among other offenses) In the matter of Mahshie (1989) 145 App.Div.2d 164, 538 NYS2d 121 cert.den 493 US 1045; (filed a lien issued by "Our One Supreme Court" against a traffic judge)  State v. Cella (Mo.App 1998) 976 SW2d 543 (but, in Cella's case, a conviction for tampering with a judge overturned because local rules allow one pre-emptory recusal motion); (threatening to have "Our One Supreme Court" proceed against IRS employees is severely punished as a "terrorist" act) US v. J.V. Wells (4th Cir 1998) 163 F3d 889; ("A property owner who has a lien recorded against his title is not without recourse. ... Quiet title actions are a statutory as well as an equitable remedy. .... Another possible action by an owner with a spuriously clouded title is a retaliatory suit for slander on title."  Terpstra v. Farmers & Merchants Bank (Ind.App 1985) 483 NE2d 749